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Abstract 
The Physical Web is a project announced by Google’s 
Chrome team that provides a framework to discover 
“smart” physical objects (e.g. vending machines, 
classroom, conference room, cafeteria, bus stop etc.) 
and interact with specific, contextual content without 
having to resort to downloading a specific app. A 
common app such as the open source and freely 
available Physical Web app on the Google Play Store 
or the BKON Browser on the Apple App Store, can 
access nearby beacons. 
 
A current work-in-progress at the University of Maui 
College is developing a campus-wide prototype 
of beacon technology using the Eddystone-URL 
protocol and beacons from vendors such as Estimote, 
Radius Networks and BKON. The project is also 
incorporating security issues using the new and 
emerging Eddystone Ephemeral-ID (EID) protocol 
from Google. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
A beacon is a low-cost hardware that transmits a 
short burst of data over a small distance using the 
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) protocol. This data 
contains basic text information that could include a 
URL and other relevant information. Any smartphone 
that supports the BLE protocol can pick up this data 
signal and present the information to the user. As a 
result of this interaction, a user can receive contextual 
information from beacons as they come within its 
proximity or range.  
 
Beacons are emerging as a novel technology for 
several types of businesses who provide contextual 
information based on the proximity of the user and the 
prevalence of smart phones. This case study presents 
an implementation of beacons within the context of an 
educational institution. However, the context and basis 
for this case study can be extended to other industries 
outside the educational arena. 
 
2. Beacons in History  
 
Beacons have been used throughout history to 
signal to users about dangerous situations or locations, 
or send coded messages during time of war. Most of 
the early beacons relied on the combination of fire, 
light or sound to convey a specific, coded message 
from the sender to the recipient. Given the physical 
location of the beacon (for example, on a dangerous 
coastline) the signal from the beacon would provide 
contextual information to the recipient. This concept of 
sending short bursts information from a physical to a 
recipient, who is within transmission range, is the 
fundamental basis for the creation and proliferation of 
these new BLE beacons.  
 
3. Background – RFID and IoT 
 
The technology behind the proliferation of BLE 
beacons is based on a history of similar advances. 
Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFID) have 
been around for decades to provide short data 
transmissions over short distances to RFID receivers. 
Retailers such as Wal-Mart have used RFID 
extensively to improve their inventory and checkout 
systems. Despite the prevalence of RFID devices, there 
have been concerns among security professionals about 
their security concerns and limitations [2, 8, 9]. Several 
papers and publications have addressed these security 
issues over time and found solutions [11, 12, 17]. 
Privacy issues regarding RFID transmitters and 
receptors have also been covered in the literature [19]. 
 
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to appliances, 
objects and other things that are enabled by access to 
the Internet. These objects could range from 
televisions, refrigerators, microwaves and other 
household objects, to physical locations and large 
objects such as buildings, buses and other physical 
things. With the accessibility of these things to the 
Internet, there are concerns about security and privacy, 
just as in the case with RFID. Various references to the 
security literature provide some solutions and 
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 mitigation efforts [6, 10, 18]. As Gartner [15] 
recommends, the base for objects that are classified 
under the IoT umbrella will swell to 20 billion in 2020! 
With this explosive growth in the things connected to 
the Internet, the impact of BLE beacons cannot be 
ignored, nor can their security and privacy issues be 
ignored or dismissed as unimportant.  
 
4. Beacons and the Physical Web  
 
Apple first introduced beacons in 2013 at the Apple 
Worldwide Developers Conference. Using the iBeacon 
protocol, Apple demonstrated beacons that transmitted 
a small unique id from a transmitter to a receiver, 
which could be an Apple iPhone. These simple devices 
provided a unique ID and a short text description from 
the beacon and alerted iPhone and other users with 
basic information when they were within range.  
 
In response to the offering from Apple, Google 
released their open specification of the Eddystone BLE 
beacon protocol in July 2015. The entire specification 
is available at GitHub (see 
https://github.com/google/eddystone) and is freely 
available to developers and vendors. The early 
specification of Eddystone was similar to iBeacon and 
focused on smartphones that supported the Android 
OS.  
 
Over time, Google upgraded their Eddystone BLE 
beacon protocol to include more than short text 
descriptions. With the introduction of the Eddystone-
URL protocol, supporting beacons could transmit a 
URL that would be resolved by a receiver (such as a 
smartphone). As a result, the recipient could obtain 
more information about the contextual information 
transmitted by the beacon, as the URL could 
potentially provide more information and details. 
 
5. Security and Privacy Issues  
 
The initial beacon protocols (iBeacon and 
Eddystone) from Apple and Google did not focus on 
security and privacy issues and concerns [1]. The BLE 
protocol also did not consider security and privacy 
issues and the usage of BLE with insecure beacons, 
essentially opened up the implementation to exploits 
[16]. With the emerging popularity of BLE beacons 
with retailers, hospitals, stadiums, educational 
institutions and other businesses, there were specific 
instances of security and privacy that were becoming 
too glaring to ignore [3].  
A key paper by Google [20] identified the security 
issues and concerns with the current Eddystone and 
iBeacon technology. The authors described the key 
issues and concerns and provided a new protocol called 
the Eddystone Ephemeral ID (EID) as a proposal 
solution [7, 13, 14]. 
 
The security issues and concerns identified by the 
authors from Google [20] includes but is not limited to 
the following: 
 
1. Tracking of beacon locations – Since the 
unique IDs from beacons can be received by 
many commonly available smartphone 
applications, it is possible to track the unique 
location of beacons. These locations identifiers 
can track the historical location of beacons and 
record their current locations. 
2. Forgery – Given that the beacon transmission 
is not secure, an adversary can transmit forged 
information over a beacon channel, thereby 
harming the reputation and integrity of the 
sender. 
3. Showrooming – In addition to the risks of 
forgery, an adversary can send competitive 
information over a beacon that is meant for a 
business, thereby confusing and misleading 
consumers. This showrooming could 
potentially cause harm to the original business. 
 
6. Case Study: Physical Web and BLE 
Beacons in an Educational Environment 
 
Given the above issues and concerns with BLE 
beacons, it is conceivable that an implementation 
within an educational institution comes with risks and 
concerns. As a result, the proposed case study at the 
University of Hawaii Maui College (UHMC) 
demonstrates the use of BLE Beacons from various 
vendors such as Estimote [1], Radius Technologies and 
BKON. Currently, beacon vendors are in varying 
stages of support for the EID protocol. As this project 
progresses at UHMC, new vendors may provide 
enhanced support for this emerging protocol. 
 
The use of Eddystone EID [20] allows for 
registered users to access specific beacons, assuming 
they are authorized to do so. If a user approaches a 
beacon that he/she is not authorized to access, the user 
does not see the beacon at all. As a result, the 
Ephemeral ID, based on registration of the beacon with 
a “global resolver”, allows only registered users to 
access specific beacons. Users need access to the 
Internet to be able to resolve their access credentials. 
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 The project at the UHMC allows for the following 
common scenarios: 
 
1. A college cafeteria can provide all students 
with the latest information about menu specials 
and hours; 
2. A college library and other locations can 
provide hours and other information to users, 
when they come in proximity of the door or 
entrance area; 
3. Conference rooms and classrooms can provide 
a brief text information and a specific custom 
URL that provides updated information on 
classroom schedule and changes (if any); 
4. Faculty members can affix beacons on their 
office or lab doors to provide students with the 
latest URL and information on their classes 
and other updates. This information is provided 
with the user approaches the beacon location; 
5. Finally, sports facilities and other event 
locations at the university can provide updated 
information about events based on an updated 
URL to the users who are in close proximity of 
the beacon. 
 
All these beacons are managed by a centralized web-
based management system that monitors the 
information that is broadcasted by the beacons, as well 
the battery strength and other specifics about the 
beacon. This management of beacon information 
provides the Information Technology (IT) staff with a 
tool to detect failing beacons and to update the URL as 
needed to provide users with the latest information. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
BLE beacons are an emerging technology and have 
recently been deployed in various physical locations 
such as educational institutions. The Physical Web is a 
collection of locations, objects and things that are 
marked with a BLE beacon that can provide users in 
close physical proximity with latest information and 
updates. Given that many users use their smartphones 
to navigate the physical world around us, this physical 
web of beacons can provide with contextual 
information as users move from one place to another.  
 
8. References  
      
[1] Are Estimote Beacons secure? How does Secure UUID 
work? url: https://community.estimote. com / hc / en - us / 
articles / 201371053 - Are - Estimote - Beacons - secure - 
How - does - Secure - UUID-work- (visited on 06/15/2016).  
 
[2] Giuseppe Ateniese, Jan Camenisch, and Breno de 
Medeiros. “Untraceable RFID tags via insubvertible 
encryption”. In: Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on 
Computer and communications security. ACM. 2005, pp. 
92–101.  
 
[3] Beacons Have Been Vulnerable For Too Long. It’s Time 
We Fixed It. url: http://kontakt.io/ blog/beacon-security/ 
(visited on 04/10/2016).  
 
[4] Bluetooth SIG. Specification of the Bluetooth○R System. 
Version 4.2. 2014.  
 
[5] Eddystone-EID. url: https : / / github . com / google / 
eddystone / eddystone - eid (visited on 06/15/2016).  
 
[6] Federal Trade Commission staff. Internet of Things: 
Privacy & security in a connected world. 2015. url: https : / / 
www . ftc . gov / system / files / documents / reports / federal 
- trade - commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-
entitled-internet-things-privacy/ 150127iotrpt.pdf (visited on 
06/15/2016).  
 
[7] Philippe Golle et al. “Universal re-encryption for 
mixnets”. In: Topics in Cryptology–CT-RSA 2004. Springer, 
2004, pp. 163–178.  
 
[8] Ari Juels. “Minimalist cryptography for low-cost RFID 
tags”. In: Security in Communication Networks. Springer, 
2004, pp. 149–164.  
 
[9] Ari Juels and Ravikanth Pappu. “Squealing Euros: 
Privacy Protection in RFID-Enabled Banknotes”. In: 
Financial Cryptography: 7th International Conference, 
Revised Papers. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003, pp. 103–
121.  
 
[10] MIT Auto-ID Center. url: 
http://autoidlabs.org/wordpress_website/ (visited on 
06/15/2016).  
 
[11] David Molnar, Andrea Soppera, and David Wagner. “A 
scalable, delegatable pseudonym protocol enabling 
ownership transfer of RFID tags”. In: Selected Areas in 
Cryptography. Springer. 2005, pp. 276–290.  
 
[12] David Molnar and David Wagner. “Privacy and security 
in library RFID: Issues, practices, and architectures”. In: 
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and 
communications security. ACM. 2004, pp. 210–219.  
 
[13] Nearby Messages API for Android: Get Beacon 
Messages. url: https://developers.google. 
com/nearby/messages/android/get-beacon-messages (visited 
on 06/15/2016).  
 
[14] Proximity Beacon API Overview. url: 
https://developers.google.com/beacons/proximity/ guides 
(visited on 06/15/2016).  
 
4264
 [15] Janessa Rivera and Rob van der Meulen. Gartner Says 
the Internet of Things Installed Base Will Grow to 26 Billion 
Units By 2020. 2013. url: 
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2636073 (visited on 
06/15/2016).  
 
[16] Mike Ryan. “Bluetooth: With Low Energy Comes Low 
Security.” In: WOOT. 2013.  
 
[17] Sanjay E. Sarma, Stephen A. Weis, and Daniel W. 
Engels. “RFID systems and security and privacy 
implications”. In: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded 
Systems-CHES 2002. Springer, 2002, pp. 454–469.  
 
[18] The Hierarchy of IoT “Thing” Needs. url: 
http://techcrunch.com/2015/09/05/the-hierarchyof-iot-thing-
needs (visited on 06/15/2016).  
 
[19] Stephen A. Weis et al. “Security and privacy aspects of 
low-cost radio frequency identification systems”. In: Security 
in pervasive computing. Springer, 2004, pp. 201–212. 
 
[20] Avinatan Hassidim et al. “Ephemeral Identifiers: 
Mitigating Tracking & Spoofing Threats BLE Beacons”. url: 
https://developers.google.com/beacons/eddystone-eid-
preprint.pdf (visited on 06/15/2016) 
 
 
4265
